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Abstract
This study investigates the effect of behavioral mistakes on the evolutionary stability
of the cooperative equilibrium in a repeated public goods game. Many studies show that
behavioral mistakes have detrimental effects on cooperation because they reduce the
expected length of mutual cooperation by triggering the conditional retaliation of the
cooperators. However, this study shows that behavioral mistakes could have positive
effects. Conditional cooperative strategies are either neutrally stable or are unstable
in a mistake-free environment, but we show that behavioral mistakes can make all of
the conditional cooperative strategies evolutionarily stable. We show that behavioral
mistakes stabilize the cooperative equilibrium based on the most intolerant cooperative
strategy by eliminating the behavioral indistinguishability between conditional coop-
erators in the cooperative equilibrium. We also show that mistakes make the tolerant
conditional cooperative strategies evolutionarily stable by preventing the defectors from
accumulating the free-rider’s advantages. Lastly, we show that the behavioral mistakes
could serve as a criterion for the equilibrium selection among cooperative equilibria.
Keywords: Evolutionary stability of cooperative strategy; Repeated public goods
game; Behavioral mistakes; Equilibrium selection
JEL Classification to be added
1 Introduction
Previous research has shown that in the context of a social dilemma, repeated interactions

























equilibrium (Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986; Fundenberg & Maskin, 1990; Axelrod & Hamilton,
1981; Taylor, 1987). This result is known as the folk theorem in economics or the reciprocity
hypothesis in evolutionary biology. However, there are some criticisms of the repeated game
approach. One of the issues is that repetition supports too many Nash equilibria, which raises
the question of equilibrium selection (Fundenberg & Maskin, 1990; Binmore & Samuelson,
1992; Axelrod, 1997; Choi, 2007; Sethi & Somanathan, 2003). In this regard, many efforts
have been made to find sharper criteria for selecting efficient equilibria (Binmore & Samuel-
son, 1992; Fundenberg & Maskin, 1990; Sethi & Somanathan, 2003).
Setting aside the problems of multiple equilibria and equilibrium selection, other problems
remain, particularly from an evolutionary perspective. Previous studies show that coopera-
tors are unlikely to evolve when they are rare in a population, especially when the group size
is large (Gintis, 2006; Boyd & Richerson, 1988), and that even the efficient equilibria that
are supported by game repetition do not satisfy dynamic stability (Young & Foster, 1991;
Gintis, 2006; Boyd & Lorberbaum, 1987; Farrell & Ware, 1989; Yao, 1996).
Among these two issues of inaccessibility and instability, the latter issue is the primary
issue that we address in this paper. We will reconfirm the conclusion from previous studies
that cooperation cannot be sustained in the long run, and we will investigate the role of
behavioral mistakes in stabilizing the cooperative equilibrium. In this paper, we analyze a
model of a repeated public goods game in an error-prone environment where the individuals
make unintended behavioral mistakes. The starting point of this paper is closely related to
several previous studies. Joshi (1987) and Boyd & Richerson (1988) studied the effectiveness
of repetition in a social dilemma situation where more than two agents are involved. Both
studies assumed a repeated n-person public goods game structure in which conditional re-
taliation is triggered whenever the number of cooperators is less than the level of tolerance
displayed by each individual. These studies introduced conditional cooperative strategies
that differ in the number of defectors that are tolerated before retaliation is triggered. In
this setting they showed that the only conditional cooperative strategy that is stable is the
one that does not tolerate any defections, and the other conditional cooperative strategies
that tolerate some defections are not stable at all.
In this regard, many studies note that the conditional cooperative strategy that does
not tolerate any defections is only neutrally stable in that it can remove defectors from
its population when the game is repeated with sufficiently high probability, but it allows
other cooperative strategies with higher tolerance levels to remain in its population. It is
because, in the absence of defectors in the population, all of the conditional cooperative
strategies, regardless of their tolerance levels, are behaviorally indistinguishable and, as a
result, receive the same payoffs. Mutant cooperative strategies with higher tolerance levels
enter the population and can cause a random drift as long as there are no defectors in
the population. This process will ultimately result in a population state having too many
tolerant conditional cooperators, which makes the population vulnerable to the invasion of
defectors into the population. This is drift problem well known in evolutionary biology. In
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other words, a population that is composed of individuals using the conditional cooperative
strategy with the least tolerance is subject to drift by which the dynamic path is ultimately
led to a situation where the population is occupied only by defectors. Cooperation cannot
be sustained in the long run and this dynamic instability is due to the fact that none of the
cooperative strategies are evolutionarily stable (Samuelson, 2002; Choi, 2007).
Here, we introduce a crucial question that remains unaddressed. Are the previous con-
clusions modified if the individual agents are allowed to make mistakes? There have been
some studies that examine the effect of mistakes on the cooperative equilibrium in a repeated
game. Most of these studies, however, only partially address the effect of behavioral errors,
primarily in the context of their detrimental effects on cooperation (Boyd, 1989; Bendor &
Mookherjee, 1987).
In this paper, we will reframe the model in an error-prone environment and show how
introducing behavioral mistakes significantly modifies the conclusions that are drawn from
an error-free assumption. As many studies have shown, mistakes have a detrimental effect
on cooperation because they trigger retaliation and reduce the expected duration of the
game. However, we will show that, in the presence of behavioral mistakes, the conditional
cooperative strategy can become evolutionarily stable. In Section 2, we set up a model of a
public goods game and introduce the dynamic stability issue of cooperative equilibrium. We
identify the dynamic property of cooperative equilibrium supported by repetition and show
why neutral stability does not guarantee the sustainability of cooperation in the long run. In
Section 3, we present a model of a public goods game where the cooperators make mistakes
and show that the cooperators’ mistakes make all of the conditional cooperative strategies
evolutionarily stable if the game is repeated with a sufficiently high probability. We also
show that the rate of mistakes serves as an equilibrium selection criterion. Lastly, in Section
4 we show that the conclusions drawn in the previous sections still hold in the more general
cases.
2 An n-Person Public Goods Game without Errors
Suppose that groups of n individuals are randomly drawn from the population to interact
repeatedly in an n-person public goods game1. Each individual’s payoff depends on his
or her action and the actions of the n − 1 other individuals in the group. Let j be the
number of cooperators among the other members in the group. Define F (C|j) and F (D|j)
as the payoff of the one-shot game for cooperation and defection, respectively, when there
are j cooperators among the n− 1 other individuals. If the player is a cooperator, then the
number of cooperators in the group becomes j + 1; otherwise, the number of cooperators
1The model of this section is based on Boyd & Richerson (1988).
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remains j. Therefore, we have
F (C|j) = b · (j + 1)
n
− c




Assume that this public goods game is repeated in each group with probability δ. For
simplicity, assume that individuals do not discount the future. Furthermore, consider a
situation with incomplete information: players know how many cooperators in their group
were in the previous stage, but they do not know exactly who defected.
Assume that the individuals only remember the outcome of the last stage. The individuals
now decide whether to cooperate in this stage conditional on how many cooperators were in
the previous stage. Define individual i’s pure strategy set, Si = {Tk|0 ≤ k ≤ n} for an integer
k. The Tk strategy is similar to a tit-for-tat strategy in a two-person prisoner’s dilemma and
can be expressed as follows: cooperate if k or more of the other n− 1 individuals cooperate
in the group during the previous stage and defect otherwise. We will call a player who uses
the Tk strategy a k-cooperator. Thus, for example, a person following the Tn−1 strategy
(i.e., an [n− 1]-cooperator) will cooperate only if every other individual cooperates, a person
with the T0 strategy will cooperate unconditionally, and a person with the Tn strategy is an
unconditional defector because it is impossible to have n cooperators among n−1 the others.
The subscript k (if k < n), therefore, refers to a player’s degree of willingness to retaliate.
We call Tn−1 the hardest (or the least tolerant) strategy because the [n− 1]-cooperator does
not tolerate any defectors in their group.
Consider a situation where every conditional cooperator has the same k, and a small
number of Tn players (unconditional defectors) appear in this population. Let the share of
mutants in the post-entry population be µ, where µ ∈ (0, 1).
When the game is repeated with the probability δ, the payoff for Tk and Tn from the




1−δF (C|j) if j > k
1
1−δF (C|j) if j = k
F (C|j) + δ




1−δF (D|j) if j > k
F (D|j) + δ
1−δF (D|0) if j = k
F (D|j) + δ
1−δF (D|0) if j < k.
(2)
After playing a repeated public goods game, the players have the chance to update their
strategy. Let pk and pn be the population frequency of the k-cooperators and the uncondi-
tional defectors, respectively. We assume that the strategy-updating occurs in the following
way: Whether the unconditional defectors can increase their frequency in a population where
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pk = 1−µ and pn = µ depends on whether the expected payoff for the Tn strategy is greater
than that for the Tk strategy. When pk = 1−µ, the expected payoffs for the Tk strategy and
the Tn strategy are
W (Tk|pk = 1− µ) =
k−1∑
j=0




W (Tn|pk = 1− µ) =
k−1∑
j=0





where m(j, pk) is the probability that an individual finds him/herself in a group in which








In general, when a mutant strategy Tk′ appears with a share of µ in a population that is
homogeneously composed of individuals following the Tk strategy (where k
′ 6= k), the Tk
strategy is neutrally stable if and only if there exists a range of µ ∈ [0, µ̄] that satisfies
W (Tk|pk = 1− µ) ≥ W (Tk′|pk = 1− µ) and that is evolutionarily stable when the condition
is satisfied with the strict inequality. This stability condition is equivalent to W (Tk|pk =
1) ≥ W (Tk′|pk = 1), and W (Tk|pk′ = 1) > W (Tk′|pk′ = 1) if W (Tk|pk = 1) = W (Tk′|pk = 1)
(Weibull, 1997).
Proposition 1. In an n-person public goods game where the game is repeated with probability
δ, the Tn−1 strategy is neutrally stable.
Proof. For the Tn−1 strategy to be neutrally stable, there should exist a µ̄ such that for
µ ∈ [0, µ̄],
W (Tn−1|pn−1 = 1− µ) ≥ W (Tk′ |pn−1 = 1− µ), ∀k′ 6= n− 1 (4)
is satisfied.
(i) For k′ < n − 1. Suppose that a mutant with Tk′ (where k′ < n − 1) appears in a
population where pn−1 = 1. In the absence of a Tn strategy, all of the conditional cooperative
strategies (i.e., all of the Tk′ strategies where k
′ < n−1 and the Tn−1 strategy) are behaviorally
indistinguishable among themselves and receive the same payoffs. In other words, any Tk
strategy players (if k < n begin the game by playing C and continue playing C until the
game ends because there would be no defection in the group in the absence of Tn. Therefore,
we have W (Tn−1|pn−1 = 1 − µ) = W (Tk′|pn−1 = 1 − µ) = (b − c)/(1 − δ) for all k′ < n − 1
and all µ.
(ii) For k′ = n. Suppose that a mutant having Tn appears in a population that is
homogeneously composed of the Tn−1 strategy players. Where pn−1 = 1 we have m(n −
5
1, pn−1) = m(n− 1, 1). Therefore, the payoff to the Tn−1 is W (Tn−1|pn−1 = 1) = 11−δF (C|n−
1) = 1





. Now we obtain the condition, 1
1−δ (b − c) >
b(n−1)
n
, which can be rearranged to δ >
c−(b/n)
b−(b/n) . Because c < b, there exists a δ < 1 that satisfies the condition. Therefore, when the
game is repeated with a sufficiently high δ, we have W (Tn−1|pn−1 = 1) > W (Tn|pn−1 = 1).
Applying the same logic to the stability of the other conditional cooperative strategies,
we can easily show that the other softer Tk strategies (where k < n− 1) are not stable. The
Tk strategies with k < n−1 tolerate the defector’s free riding behavior as long as the number
of defectors in the group does not exceed n − k − 1. As a result, these strategies allow the
defectors to invade the Tk population.
Corollary 1. In an n-person public goods game where the game is repeated with probability
δ, the Tk strategies where k < n− 1, are not stable.
Proof. Suppose that a mutant, Tn, appears in a population that is entirely composed of Tk
strategy players (k < n − 1), i.e., pk = 1. The expected payoff for the Tk strategy when pk
is equal to 1 is W (Tk|pk = 1) = (b − c)/(1 − δ) and the expected payoff to the mutant Tn
strategy when pk is equal to 1 is W (Tk|pk = 1) = b(n−1)n /(1 − δ). Because
b(n−1)
n
> b − c by
the assumption of the payoff structure, we have W (Tk|pk = 1− µ) < W (Tn|pk = 1− µ) for a
sufficiently small µ and for all k < n− 1.
That the Tn−1 strategy is only neutrally stable and not evolutionarily stable raises in-
teresting issues regarding the dynamic property of the equilibrium. Consider a population
homogeneously that is composed of individuals using Tn−1, the least tolerant cooperatrive
strategy. Because the Tn−1 individuals do not allow any free riders in their group, the defec-
tion strategy cannot invade this population if the probability of game repetition is sufficiently
high. The defectors will be retaliated against immediately and eliminated by the numeri-
cally predominant Tn−1 individuals. However, other Tk<n−1 strategies can invade the Tn−1
population because all of the conditional cooperators are behaviorally indistinguishable and
receive the same payoffs when the defectors do not exist. And this indistinguishability allows
the Tk<n−1 strategies to remain in the Tn−1 population. Once a sufficient number of Tk<n−1
strategies accumulate in the population, the defectors can invade and gain benefits from free
riding because the Tk<n−1 strategies tolerate some defections. Therefore, due to this behav-
ioral indistinguishability between Tn−1 and Tk<n−1 in the absence of a defection strategy, the
equilibrium state where only the Tn−1 strategy is present will not persist over long periods.
In the following section, we introduce behavioral mistakes and show how these mistakes
change the previous conclusions obtained from an error-free environment.
6
3 An n-Person Public Goods Game and Behavioral Er-
rors
3.1 Introducing Mistakes
Let us assume that only conditional cooperators make mistakes (to make a contribution, a
cooperator needs to take an action, whereas a defector simply does nothing). For simplic-
ity, a player who made a mistake does not know that it is he/she that made the mistake.
Cooperators only know the total number of cooperations in their group, and they determine
whether they would cooperate or defect in the next round depending on this number.
Because some cooperators defect by mistake, the payoff to individuals now depends on the
number of errors made by the cooperators as well as the number of cooperators in a group.
Let j be the number of cooperators among n− 1 other members in a group. Let ψ(j, q, ε) be
the probability that q individuals among the j other cooperators in a group make mistakes
when the probability of making a mistake is ε.





εq(1− ε)j−q for ε > 0.
The payoffs from the one-shot game, given that j among n − 1 other individuals choose
cooperation, now become
























Suppose that the game is repeated with probability δ. Let V ε(Tk|j) be the payoff for the
Tk strategy when j among the n − 1 other members in his or her group are the conditional
cooperators and the conditional cooperators play defection by mistake with probability ε.
Then, the behavioral mistakes affect V ε(Tk|j) via whether the conditional cooperators main-
tain their cooperation in the following stages as well as via a one shot payoff, F ε(C|j) and
F ε(D|j).
3.2 The stability of the Tn−1 strategy
We showed in Proposition 1 that the Tn−1 strategy is neutrally stable (not evolutionarily
stable). Now we will show how behavioral mistakes affect the stability of the Tn−1 strategy.
Consider a population that is homogeneously composed of individuals using the Tn−1 strategy.
A player with the Tn−1 strategy receives F
ε(C|n − 1) from the first round and maintains
cooperation in the next round only if there is no defection in the current round. Therefore, the
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mutual cooperation continues only if there are neither defectors’ defecting nor cooperators’
mistakenly defecting. In this environment, the payoff for the Tn−1 strategy from the repeated
game is
V ε(Tn−1|n− 1) = F ε(C|n− 1) + (1− ε)nδV (Tn−1|n− 1, ε). (5)
Rearranging the above condition gives




where (1− ε)n is the probability that no conditional cooperators make mistakes, that is, the
probability that the periods of mutual cooperation continue without triggering retaliation by
any mistakes. Suppose that there appears a mutant with the Tn strategy in this population.
This strategy will immediately trigger the Tn−1 players’ retaliation. Therefore, the payoff for
the Tn strategy is
V ε(Tn|n− 1) = F ε(D|n− 1) + δ
n−1∑
q=0
ψ(n− 1, q, ε)× 0. (7)
Suppose that there appears a mutant with the Tk strategy (k < n − 1) in the Tn−1
population. This k-cooperator plays C in the first round and keeps cooperating as long as
the number of defections that are mistakenly played by the conditional cooperators is less
than or equal to n − k − 1. The payoff for the Tk strategy from the repeated game in a
population where all of the other players are Tn−1 becomes




ψ(n− 1, q, ε)F ε(C|0), (8)
where k < n−1. The last term on the right-hand side expresses the payoff for the Tk strategy
in the next round when Tn−1 players have already withdrawn their cooperation and Tk<n−1
players continue cooperating. This situation occurs when the number of mistakes in one stage
is greater than 1 and less than or equal to n − k − 1, and k cooperators will also withdraw
cooperation thereafter. The rearrangement gives
V ε(Tk|n− 1) =
F ε(C|n− 1, ε) +
∑n−k−1




F ε(C|n− 1, ε) +
∑n−k−1








where k < n−1. Here, the behavioral mistakes have two effects on the evolution of the condi-
tional cooperative strategies. First, the mistakes reduce the period of mutual cooperation and
have a detrimental effect on the evolution of cooperation. Suppose that a group is entirely
composed of Tn−1 players. Without mistakes, all of the members continue cooperating until
the game ends, and the expected length of the period of mutual cooperation is 1
1−δ . When
the players make mistakes with probability ε, even one mistake will trigger retaliation from
the other Tn−1 players, and the mutual cooperation ends. Therefore, the period of mutual
cooperation is reduced to 1
1−(1−ε)nδ and the value of V (Tn−1|n− 1, ε) in (6) becomes smaller.
Second, in an error-prone environment, each conditional cooperator reacts differently to
the others’ mistakes according to his/her tolerance level. For example, Tn−1 players imme-
diately begin retaliation by withdrawing cooperation, Tn−2 players tolerate one mistake, and
Tn−h players tolerate h − 1 mistakes. Note that the behavioral indistinguishability between
the Tk strategies (where k < n) disappears in the absence of Tn, and the payoffs for the Tk
strategies are no longer the same, even in a situation where the Tn strategy does not exist. As
mentioned in the previous section, the dynamic instability occurs because the Tn−1 strategy is
only neutrally stable, not evolutionarily stable. In other words, the dynamic problem occurs
because both Tn−1 and Tk<n−1 receive the same payoff in the absence of a defection strat-
egy in an error-free environment. As soon as the possibility of making errors is introduced,
the problem of indistinguishability between all of the conditional cooperative strategies in
the absence of a defect strategy can be solved because each conditional cooperative strategy
reacts differently to the error that the other players make.
The following proposition shows that mistakes can eliminate the indistinguishability be-
tween the Tk<n strategies so that the state where all of the individuals are Tn−1 players is
evolutionarily stable.
Proposition 2. In an n-person public goods game where conditional cooperators have a
Tk strategy (where k ∈ {0, · · · , n − 1}), the Tn−1 strategy is evolutionarily stable when the
probability of game repetition is sufficiently close to 1 and the probability of making mistakes
is positive but sufficiently small.
Proof. The condition for the Tn−1 strategy being evolutionarily stable with respect to some
other strategy is
W (Tn−1|pn−1 = 1) > W (Tk<n−1|pn−1 = 1)
and
W (Tn−1|pn−1 = 1) > W (Tn|pn−1 = 1).
(10)
In the proof of Proposition 1, we have already shown that the first condition in Eq (10) is not
satisfied with a strict inequality when the players do not make any mistakes. That is, when
the probability of making mistakes is zero, we haveW (Tn−1|pn−1 = 1) = W (Tk<n−1|pn−1 = 1).
However, if the probability of making mistakes is positive, then we have





(i) Suppose that a mutant with the Tk′ (where k
′ < n−1 ) appears in a population where
pn−1 = 1. With the possibility of mistakes, the expected payoff to the Tk′ when pn−1 = 1 is
W (Tk′ |pn−1 = 1) = V ε(Tk′ |n − 1)m(n − 1, 1). According to Eq (8), the above equation can
be expressed as
W (Tk′ |pn−1 = 1) = V ε(Tk′ |n− 1)m(n− 1, 1)
=
F ε(C|n− 1) +
∑n−k′−1






Because 0 < b
n
< c by the assumption, comparing Eq (11) and Eq (12) gives
W (Tn−1|pn−1 = 1) > W (Tk′ |pn−1 = 1) for any k′ < n− 1, (13)
when the probability of making a mistake is positive.
(ii) Suppose that a mutant having the Tn strategy appears in a population where pn−1 = 1.
When ε > 0, the payoff to Tn from the repeated public goods game in this situation is
W (Tn|pn−1 = 1) = V ε(Tn|n− 1)m(n− 1, 1)
= F ε(D|n− 1). (14)
Therefore, for W (Tn−1|pn−1 = 1) > W (Tn|pn−1 = 1), we should have
V ε(Tn−1|n− 1) =
F ε(C|n− 1)
1− (1− ε)nδ
> F ε(D|n− 1) = V ε(Tn|n− 1). (15)
The above can be satisfied if
(1− ε)nδ > 1− F
ε(C|n− 1, ε)
F ε(D|n− 1, ε)
. (16)







) and that this is always less than 1 by the
assumption b
n
− c < 0. That is, the right-hand side of the condition is always less than
1. Therefore, with a sufficiently large δ and sufficiently a small ε, the above condition is
satisfied.
As long as there is a probability of making mistakes, the indistinguishability between
the hardest cooperators and the other softer cooperators disappears, which makes the Tn−1
equilibrium state evolutionarily stable under certain parameter values. The Tk strategies
(k < n− 1) are now behaviorally distinguishable from the Tn−1 strategy because the condi-
tional cooperative strategies are, depending on the level of k, different in their responding
to the mistakes, even though there are no defectors in the population. In other words, in an
environment where the players make mistakes, the Tk strategies cannot invade a population
that is homogeneously composed of individuals using the Tn−1 strategy.
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3.3 The stability of the Tk strategy (k < n− 1).
Mistakes also affect the evolutionary stability of the softer strategies. Note that the Tk
strategies when k < n − 1 are not stable at all in an error-free environment because these
strategies allow the universal defection strategy (i.e., the Tn strategy) to enjoy benefits from
free riding on the cooperation of these strategies (see Corollary 1).
To see the effect of mistakes on the stability of the Tk strategy, consider a population that
entirely composed of players who have a Tk strategy with the same hardness level k. A player
with the Tk strategy receives F
ε(C|n− 1) from the first round and maintains cooperation in
the next round as long as the number of defections is less than n − k − 1. Therefore, the
mutual cooperation continues when
• the number of mistakes made by the n − 1 other conditional cooperators is less than
or equal to n − k − 2 (in this case, the maintenance of mutual cooperation does not
depend on whether the focal individual makes a mistake or not), or
• the number of mistakes made by the n − 1 other conditional cooperators is exactly
equal to n− k − 1, and the focal player does not make a mistake.
The first case occurs with probability
∑n−k−2
q=0 ψ(n − 1, q, ε) and the second case with prob-
ability ψ(n − 1, n − k − 1, ε) × (1 − ε). By the same token, the mutual cooperation breaks
when
• the number of mistakes made by the n − 1 other conditional cooperators is exactly
equal to n− k − 1, and the focal player makes a mistake, or
• the number of mistakes made by the n−1 other conditional cooperators is greater than
n− k − 1.
Each case occurs with probability ψ(n − 1, n − k − 1, ε) × ε and
∑n−1
q=n−k ψ(n − 1, q, ε),
respectively. Summing up all of the possible cases, the expected payoff for the Tk strategy
when the population is entirely composed of individuals following the Tk strategy (k < n−1)
is written in the following way.




q=0 ψ(n− 1, q, ε)V ε(Tk|n− 1) +
ψ(n− 1, n− k − 1, ε)[ε× 0 + (1− ε)× V ε(Tk|n− 1)] +∑n−1
q=n−k ψ(n− 1, q, ε)× 0,
(17)
if k < n− 1.
Suppose that there appears one defector (i.e., a player with strategy Tn) in the homoge-
nous population of a Tk strategy where every player has the same tolerance level k < n− 1.
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When the game is repeated with probability δ , the payoff to the Tn player from the repeated
game is calculated by













As long as the number of defections, either due to mistakes by the Tk players or the defection
of the Tn player, is less than n − k − 1, Tk players will tolerate defections and maintain
cooperation. In this case, the Tn player keeps enjoying a free rider’s advantage from the
repeated interaction (see (i) in Eq (18)). When the number of defections exceeds n− k − 1,
all of the Tk players trigger retaliation, which gives every member a 0 payoff in the following
rounds (see (ii) in Eq (18)).
It will be shown that it is crucial to have V ε(Tk|n − 1) − V ε(Tn|n − 1) > 0 to prove the
evolutionarily stability of the Tk strategy. Rearranging Eq (17) and Eq (18) gives




q=0 ψ(n− 1, q, ε)− δ(1− ε)ψ(n− 1, n− k − 1, ε)
(19)
and




q=0 ψ(n− 1, q, ε)
, (20)
respectively. The condition that the payoff for the Tk strategy is greater than the payoff for
the Tn strategy is





q=0 ψ(n− 1, q, ε)− δ(1− ε)ψ(n− 1, n− k − 1, ε)
− F (D|n− 1)
1− δ
∑n−k−2




















. Note that the sign of V ε(Tk|n − 1) − V ε(Tn|n − 1)
depends on the sign of ∆(ε; k)− (1− F
ε(C|n−1)
F ε(D|n−1)). Because it holds that 0 < 1−
F ε(C|n−1)
F ε(D|n−1) < 1,
and F
ε(C|n−1)
F ε(D|n−1) is fixed by the payoff structure of the public goods game, it is crucial to have
a sufficiently large ∆(ε; k).
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A Tk strategy (where k ∈ {1, · · · , n− 2}) is evolutionarily stable if
W (Tk|pk = 1) > W (Tk′|pk = 1) ∀k′ 6= k. (22)
In the following proposition, we will show that all of the conditional cooperative strategies
are evolutionarily stable when ε is positive and within a proper open interval and when δ is
sufficiently large. We will show that W (Tk|pk = 1) > W (Tk′ |pk = 1) for k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 2}
in all of the following three cases where (1) a mutant is a conditional cooperator who has
a softer strategy (i.e., k′ < k), (2) a mutant is a conditional cooperator who has a harder
strategy (i.e., k < k′ < n), or (3) a mutant is a defector (i.e., k′ = n).
Proposition 3. In an n-person public goods game where the conditional cooperators have a
Tk strategy (k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n − 1}), the Tk strategies where 0 < k < n − 1 are evolutionarily
stable when the probability of game repetition is sufficiently close to 1 and the probability of
making mistakes is positive and sufficiently small.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Tk strategies with (0 < k < n − 1) are not stable at all in an error-free environment
but become evolutionarily stable when mistakes are introduced, i.e., they do not allow the
invasion of other strategies into their population because the mistakes made by the conditional
cooperators produce unintended defections among themselves and leave little room for the
defector’s free riding. The proof of the above proposition consists of three steps. First,
when conditional cooperators make mistakes the expected payoff for the Tk strategy in the
repeated game is greater than the expected payoff to the mutant Tn strategy (see Appendix
A, Lemma 1). Behavioral mistakes, if they occur with a sufficiently low probability, no longer
allow the defectors to invade the population that homogeneously consists of individuals using
the Tk strategy (where 0 < k < n − 1). Behavioral mistakes produce unintended defections
among the cooperators (i.e., even without a defector’s invasion), so that softer conditional
cooperators are less likely to tolerate a defector’s invasion. Second, if the expected payoff for
the Tk strategy in the repeated game is greater than that for the mutant Tn strategy, then
it is also true that the expected payoff for the Tk strategy in the repeated game is greater
than the mutant Tk′ strategy’s payoff if k
′ is greater than k, i.e., if the mutants are harder
conditional cooperators (see Appendix A, Lemma 2). Third, behavioral mistakes also make
the expected payoff to the Tk strategy in the repeated game when one of these strategies
invades Tk population greater than the other conditional cooperative strategies that havek
′
lower than k (see Appendix A, Lemma 3). Error makes those strategies distinguishable and
makes the payoff for the Tk strategy higher (same logic as proof for Proposition 2).
In an error-free environment, no conditional cooperative strategies are evolutionarily sta-
ble. The Tn−1 strategy is neutrally stable and is subject to the drift ultimately destroying
the cooperative equilibrium, and none of the Tk<n−1 strategies are stable at all. Proposition
2 and Proposition 3 say that behavioral errors, if they occur with sufficiently low probability,
can make all conditional cooperative strategies evolutionarily stable.
13
3.4 Error and selection among evolutionarily stable strategies
In the above section, we showed that conditional cooperative strategies, Tk for k ∈ {1, · · · , n−
1}, are evolutionarily stable when ε is positive but sufficiently low. Furthermore, each Tk
strategy has its own critical value of εk such that the strategy is evolutionary stable in the
range of ε ∈ (0, εk). If the critical value of each Tk strategy differs according to the hardness
level k, the magnitude of the probability that a behavioral error occurs could serve as a
criterion for equilibrium selection.
In this section, we will show that the range of ε supporting the evolutionary stability of
the Tk strategy varies according to the tolerance of the conditional cooperative strategies.
Let εk be the supremum of ε that supports the evolutionary stability of a Tk strategy (where
k ∈ {1, · · · , n − 1}). We will show that εk increases as k decreases, that is, 0 < εn−1 <
εn−2 < · · · < ε1. For example, if the probability of making an error is sufficiently low so
that 0 < ε < εn−1, then all of the conditional cooperative strategies are evolutionarily stable.
If the error rate is in the range of εn−1 ≤ ε < εn−2, then all of the conditional cooperative
strategies except for Tn−1 are evolutionarily stable, and so on. Lastly, if the error rate is
higher than or equal to ε1, no conditional cooperative strategies are evolutionarily stable, in
which case only the universal defection strategy, Tn, is evolutionarily stable. In other words,
all conditional cooperative strategies are evolutionarily stable when 0 < ε < εn−1 and fewer
of the conditional cooperative strategies remain evolutionarily stable as ε increases.
Proposition 4. Let εk be the supremum of ε that supports the evolutionary stability of
the Tk strategy (where k ∈ {1, · · · , n − 1}). Then, εk increases as k decreases, that is,
0 < εn−1 < εn−2 < · · · < ε1.
Proof. See Appendix B.
In other words, as ε increases, the Tk strategies with a lower k (i.e., with a higher tolerance
level) remain evolutionarily stable. To understand the role of behavioral mistakes in the
equilibrium selection in the above proposition, we need to examine the two effects that the
mistakes produce. First, the mistakes lower the probability that the mutually cooperative
phase continues because they trigger retaliation towards cooperators’ unintended defections.
Secondly, they also reduce the possibility that the defectors enjoy benefits from free riding
on tolerant cooperators. If the incumbent conditional cooperators have a lower k, the first
effect is less detrimental because the cooperative equilibrium based on the lower k is less
vulnerable to a breakdown when a mistake occurs with higher probability.
4 The General Case Where δ is Sufficiently High But
Not at the Limit of 1
One should note that only the supremum of ε matters in Proposition 4. We proved the
proposition at the δ = 1 limit, in which case the infimum becomes meaningless as long as the
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rate of mistakes is positive. At the δ = 1 limit, error will at some point terminate the game
and enable the Tk strategy with a low k to block the defectors from endlessly accumulating a
free rider’s benefit. That is, at the δ = 1 limit, error appears to work as long as ε is positive
(See Figure 1 (a)).
However, when δ is large but not at the limit of 1, the Tk strategy (0 < k < n− 1) needs
a sufficiently high rate of ε to block the defectors’ free riding. The role of error in supporting
the evolutionary stability of cooperative strategies depends on whether it produces enough
defections among the cooperators before the defectors’ invasion. Note that the number of
mistakes to prevent defectors from invading depends on the level of tolerance. As k becomes
lower, more unintended defections among the cooperators are needed to terminate the game
repetition (i.e., to block a defector from gaining a free riding benefit) in case one defector
appears in a group. In other words, there should be an infimum of ε to make the Tk strategy
evolutionarily stable. In this section, we show that the conclusions derived in the former
section are still valid with some modification, especially for the infimum in the general case
where δ is sufficiently high but not at the limit of 1.
Here, we analyze a more general case where δ is less than 1. At the δ = 1 limit, we
showed that each Tk strategy, where k < n, has the supremum, εk, such that the Tk strategy
is evolutionary stable for ε ∈ (0, εk) and that εk is increasing as k decreases.
In the following propositions, we will now show that each conditional cooperative Tk
strategy has its own band of error rate (εk, εk) that makes the Tk strategy evolutionarily
stable. In other words, there appears an infimum of ε that supports the evolutionary stability
of each Tk strategy and the infimum moves toward zero as δ approaches 1. Now we can provide
a generalized versions of Proposition 2, Proposition 3 and Proposition 4.
Proposition 5. In an n-person public goods game where the conditional cooperators have a
Tk strategy (k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n− 1}), all of the Tk strategies are evolutionarily stable when the
probability of game repetition is sufficiently high and the probability of making mistakes is in
the range of (εk, εk).
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 6. In an n-person public goods game where conditional cooperators have a Tk
strategy (k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n− 1}), both εk and εk increase as k decreases and εn−1 = 0, that is,
0 = εn−1 < εn−2 < · · · < ε1 and 0 < εn−1 < εn−2 < · · · < ε1 < 1, when the probability of
game repetition is sufficiently high.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Figure 1 makes our argument clear. All of the above propositions show that the stability
condition critically depends on the sign of ∆(ε; k)− (1− F
ε(C|n−1)
F ε(D|n−1)). This means that ∆(ε; k)
should be sufficiently large to offset 1− F
ε(C|n−1)
F ε(D|n−1) . The three panels in Figure 1 show ∆(ε; k)
for three different values of δ. One can easily check the following. First, the ∆(ε; k) value
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(b) δ = 0.9












(c) δ = 0.8
Figure 1. ∆(ε; k) with δ. (n = 10)
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becomes larger as δ increases, and our previous propositions hold if δ approaches 1. Second,
when δ is less than one, the probability of mistakes should be sufficiently large (i.e., the
infimum is important as well as its supremum to support cooperation) and the infimum
becomes zero when δ approaches 1.
5 Conclusion
This study examined the effect of behavioral mistakes on the dynamic stability of the cooper-
ative equilibrium in a repeated public goods game. This study shows that while a behavioral
mistake has detrimental effects on cooperation because it reduces the length of the period of
mutual cooperation by triggering the conditional cooperators’ retaliation, a behavioral mis-
take also has a positive effect by making the conditional cooperative strategies evolutionarily
stable. This paper shows that the behavioral mistakes stabilize the cooperative equilibrium
based on the hardest cooperative strategy by eliminating the behavioral indistinguishability
between the conditional cooperative strategies at the cooperative equilibrium. This paper
shows that the mistakes also stabilize the cooperative equilibrium based on a softer coop-
erative strategy by producing unintended defection among the cooperators and making the
softer conditional cooperators less tolerant of a defector’s invasion. Finally, the paper shows
that the error rate, ε, could serve as an equilibrium selection criterion because each equilib-
rium that is based on a different level of tolerance is supported by different ranges for the
error rate.
A The Proof of Proposition 3
Consider a population that is entirely composed of conditional cooperators who have the
same hardness (where k < n− 1). The payoff to the Tk strategy when pk = 1 is
W (Tk|pk = 1) = V ε(Tk|n− 1)m(n− 1, pk = 1)

















because m(n− 1, pk = 1) = 1. The payoff to the mutant Tn strategy is
W (Tn|pk = 1) = V ε(Tn|n− 1)m(n− 1, pk = 1)
= F ε(D|n− 1) + δ
n−k−2∑
q=0
ψ(n− 1, q, ε)V ε(Tn|n− 1), (25)
which gives




q=0 ψ(n− 1, q, ε)
. (26)
Now, the following three lemmas show that any Tk (for 0 < k < n − 1) is evolutionarily
stable for a sufficiently large δ close to 1 and a sufficiently small ε ∈ (0, 1). The proof is
presented at the end.
Lemma 1. For a sufficiently large δ close to 1, there exists a unique εk such that V
ε(Tk|n−
1)− V ε(Tn|n− 1) > 0 for ε ∈ (0, εk).
Proof. The sign of V ε(Tk|n − 1) − V ε(Tn|n − 1) is determined by ∆(ε; k) − (1 − F
ε(C|n−1)
F ε(D|n−1))








(1− ε)ψ(n− 1, n− k − 1, ε)
1−
∑n−k−2
q=0 ψ(n− 1, q, ε)
=
(1− ε)ψ(n− 1, n− k − 1, ε)∑n−1


























∆(ε; k) = 0.
Because 0 < 1− F
ε(C|n−1)
F ε(D|n−1) < 1,{
V ε(Tk|n− 1)− V ε(Tn|n− 1) > 0 if ε→ 0
V ε(Tk|n− 1)− V ε(Tn|n− 1) < 0 if ε→ 1.
Because V ε(·) is continuous for ε ∈ (0, 1), then there exists at least one ε that makes V ε(Tk|n−









































which is always negative for ε ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 2. Suppose that a mutant Tk′ (for k
′ ∈ {k+1, . . . , n−1} ) appears in a homogeneous
population of Tk. V
ε(Tk|n−1)−V ε(Tk′|n−1) has the same sign as V ε(Tk|n−1)−V ε(Tn|n−1).
Proof. The payoff for strategy Ta from the repeated game is given by
V ε(Tk′ |n− 1) =F ε(C|n− 1) + δ

∑n−k′−1
q=0 ψ(n− 1, q, ε) · V ε(Tk′ |n− 1) +∑n−k−2
q=n−k′ ψ(n− 1, q, ε) · V ε(Tn|n− 1) +∑n−1
q=n−k−1 ψ(n− 1, q, ε) · 0.
To check the stability, it is noted that
V (Tk|n− 1)− V (Tk′ |n− 1) =
(δ
∑n−k−2
q=n−k′ ψ(n− 1, q, ε) + δ(1− ε)ψ(n− 1, n− k′ − 1, ε))F (D|n− 1)
(1− δ
∑n−k−2
q=0 ψ(n− 1, q, ε)− δ(1− ε)ψ(n− 1, n− k − 1, ε))(1− δ
∑n−k′−1







q=n−k′ ψ(n− 1, q, ε){1− δ
∑n−k−2
q=0 ψ(n− 1, q, ε)− δ(1− ε)ψ(n− 1, n− k − 1, ε)}
(1− δ
∑n−k−2
q=0 ψ(n− 1, q, ε)){δ
∑n−k−2






1− δ(1− ε)ψ(n− 1, n− k − 1, ε)
1− δ
∑n−k−2
q=0 ψ(n− 1, q, ε)
]
.
The RHS of the last inequality is the exactly the same condition for V ε(Tk|n−1)−V ε(Tn|n−
1) > 0, which completes the proof.
Lemma 3. When a mutant Tk′ (for k
′ < k) appears in the homogeneous population of Tk,
V ε(Tk|n− 1)− V ε(Tk′ |n− 1) > 0.
Proof. It is easy to see that the Tk is strictly dominant against a single mutant Tk′ for all
parameters because b
n
− c < 0 (See also the proof of Proposition 2).
The proof for Proposition 3 is as follows:
Proof. According to Lemma 1, there exists an εk such that V
ε(Tk|n − 1) − V ε(Tn|n − 1) >
0 if ε < εk and V
ε(Tk|n − 1) − V ε(Tn|n − 1) ≤ 0 otherwise. According to Lemma 2,
V ε(Tk|n−1)−V ε(Tk′ |n−1) > 0 for k < k′ < n if ε satisfies V ε(Tk|n−1)−V ε(Tn|n−1) ≥ 0.
Lastly, according to Lemma 3, V ε(Tk|n − 1) is always greater than V ε(Tk′|n − 1) if k′ < k.
These three lemmas lead to the conclusion that Tk is evolutionarily stable if ε ∈ (0, εk).
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B The Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. According to Lemma 1, because F
ε(C|n−1)
F ε(D|n−1) − 1 is fixed, ∆(ε; k) determines V
ε(Tk|n−
1) − V ε(Tn|n − 1). Thus, when ∆(ε; k) > ∆(ε; k + 1) holds for ε ∈ (0, 1), the proof is
completed.
∆(ε; k + 1)−∆(ε; k) =
(1− ε)
[
ψ(n− 1, n− k − 2, ε)
1−
∑n−k−3
q=0 ψ(n− 1, q, ε)
− ψ(n− 1, n− k − 1, ε)
1−
∑n−k−2






















It is easy to check that the denominator of the first part is always larger than that of the
second, which confirms that ∆(ε; k) > ∆(ε; k + 1). In other words, the Tn strategy can
always invade a population that is entirely composed of individuals using Tk+1 strategy if
ε = εk. Following the previous lemmas, there should be an εk+1 such that the Tk+1 strategy
is evolutionarily stable for ε ∈ (0, εk+1). V ε(Tk+1|n− 1)− V ε(Tn|n− 1) > 0 for ε ∈ (0, εk+1)
and V ε(Tk+1|n − 1) − V ε(Tn|n − 1) < 0 for ε = εk, which implies that εk+1 < εk for
k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 2}.
C The Proof of Proposition 5
In the proof of Proposition 3 (Appendix A), only Lemma 1 needs the necessary condition
that δ is at the limit of 1. We will show that V ε(Tk|n− 1)−V ε(Tn|n− 1) > 0 for ε ∈ (εk, εk)
as long as δ is sufficiently high such that F (C|n−1)
F (D|n−1) − 1 + ∆(ε; k) > 0 but is not close to 1. We
will provide three lemmas and present the proof of the proposition at the end.
First of all, ∆(ε; k) is rewritten as
∆(ε; k) =
δ(1− ε)ψ(n− 1, n− k − 1, ε)
1− δ
∑n−k−2
q=0 ψ(n− 1, q, ε)
=
δ





















ψ(n− 1, q, ε) =
1− n−k−2∑
q=0
ψ(n− 1, q, ε)
+ n−k−2∑
q=0




ψ(n− 1, q, ε) +
1− n−1∑
q=n−k−1
ψ(n− 1, q, ε)
 (1− δ)
= (1− δ) + δ
n−1∑
q=n−k−1
ψ(n− 1, q, ε).
Now, our discussion is based on D1(ε; ·)+D2(ε; ·) instead of ∆(ε; ·); because D1, D2 > 0, this
can be one-to-one mapped inversely onto ∆.
Lemma 4. D1(ε; k) +D2(ε; k) is strictly convex for ε ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. It is to be shown that D
′′
1 (ε, ·) > 0 and D
′′





n(1 + n)ε2 − 2(n+ 1)(n− k − 1)ε+ (n− k)(n− k − 1)
]
(1− ε)−k−3εk−n−1 > 0
∂2[(ε)q(1− ε)−q−1]
∂ε2
= [2ε2 + 4εq + q(q − 1)](ε)q−2(1− ε)−q−2 > 0.
for ε ∈ (0, 1).









k, k) = 0. For k = n− 1, no such ε∗k exists.
Proof. First of all, it is given that D
′
1(ε, n− 1) +D
′
2(ε, n− 1) = 1δ(1−ε)n , which shows that no
ε∗k exists. A direct calculation shows that
∂[(ε)−n+k+1(1− ε)−k−1]
∂ε
= [k + 1− (1− ε)n](ε)k−n(1− ε)−2−k (28)
∂[(ε)q(1− ε)−q−1]
∂ε
= q(ε)q−1(1− ε)−q−1 + (q + 1)(ε)q(1− ε)−q−2. (29)
For a sufficiently small ε, (28) is negative, and its absolute value can be arbitrarily larger,


















k, k) > 0. As D
′
1(·) and D′2(·) are continuous, there exists at least one








k, k) = 0.
Lemma 6. For a given k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n − 2}, D1(ε, k) + D2(ε, k) has a unique minimum
over ε ∈ (0, 1). The infimum of D1(ε, n− 1) +D2(ε, n− 1) is obtained at ε = 0.
21
Proof. It is trivial for the case of k = n− 1. For 0 < k < n− 1, the previous two lemmas are
the conditions that D1(ε, k) +D2(ε, k) has a unique minimum somewhere at ε ∈ (0, 1).
The proof for Proposition 5 is as follows:
Proof. At first, it is easy to check that k = n − 1 makes εn−1 = 0, and the proof can be
provided by the same method used in Proposition 3. Lemma 6 implies that ∆(ε, k) should
have a single maximum over ε ∈ (0, 1) for 0 < k < n− 1. When the proper δ is given, there
exists an ε ∈ (εk, εk) that makes V ε(Tk|n− 1)− V ε(Tn|n− 1) > 0.
D The Proof of Proposition 6
For the proof, we need a characterization of the shapes of D1(ε; k) +D2(ε; k) over ε ∈ (0, 1)
for the different k. For this characterization, the following three lemmas are provided, and
the proof is presented at the end.
Lemma 7. For any k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n− 2}, D′1(ε; k + 1) +D
′





over ε ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. A direct calculation shows that
D
′






























(k + 1)(n− k − 1)(k − q + 1)(n+ q − k − 1)
){






) [qεk(1− ε)−k−2 + (q + 1)εk+1(1− ε)−k−3] > 0
Let us define ε∗k = arg min{D1(ε; k) +D2(ε; k) : ε ∈ (0, 1)} for k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n− 1}.
Lemma 8. For any 0 < k < n − 1, D1(ε∗k; k + 1) + D2(ε∗k; k + 1) = D1(ε∗k; k) + D2(ε∗k; k)
holds.








k; k) = 0. We should have [D1(ε
∗
k; k) − D1(ε∗k; k + 1)] +
[D2(ε
∗















k, k) = [D1(ε
∗













k, k) + [D2(ε
∗
k; k)−D2(ε∗k; k + 1)] = 0.
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Lemma 9. For 0 < k < n− 1,{
D1(ε; k) +D2(ε; k) > D1(ε; k + 1) +D2(ε; k + 1) for ε ∈ (0, ε∗k)
D1(ε; k) +D2(ε; k) < D1(ε; k + 1) +D2(ε; k + 1) for ε ∈ (ε∗k, 1).
Proof. Let us define that
d(ε) = [D1(ε; k) +D2(ε; k)]− [D1(ε; k + 1) +D2(ε; k + 1)] .
It is noted that d′(ε) < 0 by Lemma 7, and d(ε∗k) = 0 by Lemma 8. As two curves cannot
be tangent, d(ε) should change its sign around ε∗k. We prove that d(ε) should change its
sign only once around ε∗k, from positive to negative. i) For a sufficiently small value of ε,
D1(ε; k)−D1(ε; k+1) can become arbitrarily larger while D2(ε; k+1)−D2(ε; k) can become
arbitrarily smaller. Hence, there exists an ε̂k such that d(ε) > 0 is ensured for ε ∈ (0, ε̂k).
ii) Let us assume that d(ε) would change its sign around ε̂k < ε
∗
k from positive to negative.
As d(ε̂k) = 0 and d
′(ε) < 0, d(ε) < 0 holds for ε ∈ (ε̂k, 1). Thus, d(ε∗k) = 0 cannot be satisfied
without violating the strict convexity of D1 +D2. iii) Once d(ε
∗
k) = 0 is realized, by the same
logic, d(ε) < 0 holds for ε ∈ (ε∗k, 1).
The proof for Proposition 6 is as follows:
Proof. According to Lemma 9, for 0 < ε < ε∗k, ∆(ε; k) < ∆(ε; k + 1) holds, and ∆(ε; k) >
∆(ε; k + 1) holds for ε∗k < ε < 1. Also the lemma implies that the single-maximum curves
of ∆(ε; k) and ∆(ε; k + 1) should be configured such that the only intersection between the
two is realized at the descending part of ∆(ε; k+ 1). When a sufficiently high δ is given, the
proposition is satisfied.
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